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The Lisbon Treaty and the Emergence of Third Generation 
Regional Integration 
 
 
Dr Luk Van Langenhove
♦ 
Daniele Marchesi 
♣
 
Introduction 
 
European integration can be regarded as the most advanced and successful regional integration 
experience  accomplished  so  far.
1  Among  the  numerous  integration  schemes  that  have 
mushroomed in Europe since the end of World War II, the European Union (EU) has emerged as 
a  unique  process  and  as  a  prototype  of  what  can  been  defined  as  a  “third-generation”  of 
regionalism.
2 In this view, the EU has developed beyond a mainly economic integration process 
(first generation regionalism), to a deeply institutionalised and politicised union, competent at 
various degrees in an all-encompassing spectrum of internal policies (second generation or “new 
regionalism”). In this process of widening/deepening of policies, structures and membership, the 
EU has become a global actor present in the international fora where once only states operated 
(third generation). 
When ratified, the 2007 Lisbon Treaty promises to represent an additional episode of this 
incremental integrative process, through which the EU is progressively becoming a global actor. 
Following the last 2004 and 2007 enlargements that have brought the membership to 27, the 
Treaty carries with it a considerable amount of structural reforms that are supposed to make the 
Union  more  efficient,  and  more  democratic.  Among  these  reforms  is  a  new  mechanism  of 
qualified majority voting, a clearer distinction in the division of competencies, an expansion of 
codecision, which becomes the ordinary decision making procedure, and the end of the formal 
pillar structure, as well as an enhanced role for national parliaments, especially in safeguarding 
the principle of subsidiarity. Especially in external relations, some major innovations would be 
introduced such as the legal personality for the EU, the new President of the European Council 
and the High Representative and Vice President of the Commission, assisted by an External 
Action Service. This article explores the implications of these new institutional developments for 
the emergence of the EU as a “third generation regional organization”, i.e. becoming a fully-
fledged actor in international relations, engaging proactively and in a unitary way with other 
regions and at the multilateral level.   
To tackle this key issue, this paper is divided in two parts. The first part will look at the 
typology of three-generational regionalism and at how the EU fits into this scheme. The second 
part, focuses on the challenges for the EU’s foreign policy and looks at the external implications 
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of the Lisbon treaty and, particularly, on its possible impact on the EU’s actorness in the UN.  By 
doing  so,  the  paper  hopes  also  to  shed  some  further  light  on  the  interrelation  and  possible 
synergies  between  regionalism  studies  and  European  studies  in  understanding  the  EU  as  an 
international  actor.  It  will  be  argued  that  the  Lisbon  Treaty  could  constitute  an  institutional 
opportunity for the EU to develop into a more coherent and visible player on the international 
stage. This opportunity, however, is limited by the UN structure itself - which is still impervious 
to  regional  organisations  -  and  by  the  ambiguities  in  the  EU’s  member  states  strategies  and 
motivations. These ambiguities in turn, preserve the originality of the EU a new type of global 
actor, different from a state.   
1. Three-generation regionalism and the European Union 
 
The study of the phenomenon of regionalism has been intrinsically linked to the study of the 
process of European integration following World War II. As a regional scheme, the European 
Communities and then the European Union represent an advanced example of institutionalised 
regionalism. At the same time, European integration as a project, has been pictured as a clear 
political success in terms of achieving prosperity and stability in a given territory where war and 
violence was the rule. This led to the partial identification of the process of regionalism with the 
European experience in two ways. On the one hand, it was implied that the global process of 
regionalism had to take Europe as a model and as an outcome. On the other hand, regionalism in 
itself came to be considered a political project, and regional integration around the world was 
viewed as a desirable and “good” outcome to complement and support global governance.
3   
This view has now been widely criticised both academically and politically. Academically, 
as Hurrell puts it, “the most important ‘lesson’ of Europe is that there are so few good grounds for 
believing that Europe is the future of other regions”.
4 In other words, the specific circumstances 
and factors that characterised the emergence of the European integration experience can hardly be 
found in other parts of the world.
5 And in fact every regionalism is somewhat different from the 
other,  ranging  from  highly  institutionalised  schemes  such  as  the  EU,  to  instances  of  soft 
regionalism as seen, for example in South East Asia with ASEAN. Politically, regionalism has 
been criticised as a Eurocentric project, which risks undermining the wider multilateral system, in 
particular  concerning  trade  liberalisation  and  the  WTO.  What  is  clear  is  that  regionalism  is 
becoming more and more a new and additional layer in the governance of globalisation both at 
the micro, intra-state level, and at the macro, inter-state level.
6  
 
Generations of Regionalism 
 
In  an  attempt  to  clarify  the  problem  of  comparing  the  different  existing  forms  of  regional 
integration, the typology of the three-generations of regional integration can serve as a useful tool 
to  go  beyond  the  traditional  chronological  and  qualitative  dichotomy  between  old  and  new 
regionalism.
7  
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The  argument  typifies  regionalism  in  three  main  ideal-typical  cohorts  or  generations, 
through  which  we  can  distinguish  the  different  schemes  according  to  the  aspect  of  state 
governance  around  which  they  are  primarily  built.  (i)  The  operation  of  a  state  territory  as  a 
‘single’  market  with  a  related  economic  policy;  (ii)  the  governance  of  public  goods  and  the 
control over resources and power and (iii) the external sovereignty that allows to be an ‘actor’ in 
international relations. Each cohort is driven by a specific objective or télos - the ideal end-point 
of integration in that aspect of governance - and materialises in a concrete development process 
that will not necessarily reach its culmination. Importantly, the three generations coexist and 
influence each other, often within the same organisation. Each regional scheme and organisation 
follows  its  own  integration  trajectory  and  can  remain  insulated  within  one  dimension  of 
governance  or,  alternatively,  spill-over  and  cumulate  the  characteristics  from  the  other 
generations/cohorts of regional integration.   
The  development  of  each  specific  regional  scheme  can,  thus,  also  be  benchmarked  in 
relation to the three téloi of complete integration. Per each cohort, the development will depend 
on  the  level  of  comprehensiveness  (in  terms  of  competencies),  capacity  (in  terms  of  tools), 
cohesiveness (in terms of identity) and autonomy (from the national level). In theory, a complete 
and simultaneous integration in all three governance domain would result in the creation of a new 
supranational polity. 
More specifically, the first generation of regional integration is characterised by mainly 
economic integration leading to experiences such as free trade agreements, custom unions, or 
common markets. These schemes are characterised mainly by “negative integration” - a process 
of  removing  the  barriers  to  the  free  flow  of  economic  factors  -  and  by  the  widening  of  the 
membership included in the process. Actual transfer or pooling of sovereignty, though, can occur, 
as in the case of custom unions, where a common external tariff is put in place, as well as in 
monetary unions.  The télos of first generation integration is thus the creation of a new single 
market that comprises the old national markets of each of the participating states.
8 
Second-generation regionalism describes regional schemes where the focus of cooperation 
is  not  purely  economic  but  concerns  mainly  the  political  sphere,  including  regulation, 
redistribution  or  security.  Regional  schemes  of  this  second  generation  proliferated  across  all 
continents, particularly following the end of the Cold War in a complex process that was then 
labelled with the all-encompassing notion of “new regionalism”. As it is much narrower than 
“new regionalism”, the concept of “second-generation” is quite pregnant and more useful for 
comparison.  The  télos  of  “second-generation”  schemes  is  to  establish  a  common  approach 
towards what is usually referred to as ‘internal affairs’: this includes infrastructure, energy and 
environment policy, but also security policy, social policy, health, employment, research, etc. 
Also here, the level of integration can vary from superficial political dialogue and coordination, to 
actual binding regulation and common policies. Further, the process of policy expansion can be 
accompanied by a process of democratisation of the supranational level, through the creation of 
parliamentary assemblies, the concentration of interest representation and other instances of input 
legitimacy and participation.  
In the specific EU case, political (second-generation) cooperation and “positive integration” 
emerged as a consequence - for instance through functional “spill over” - of the previous negative 
integration (first-generation), which was failing to achieve a functioning common market. As a 
broader  concept,  however,  second-generation  regionalism  can  also  be  an  original  project  not 
stemming from an economic integration dynamic or anticipating economic integration. Finally, 
second-generation regionalism, is conceptually introspective, focussing at managing problems 
that are internal to the regional area. This is not to say that this regionalism is cut off from the 
outside world. On the contrary, both first and second-generation regionalisms are in many ways 
responses to the wider globalisation process and to the problems and challenges that derive from 
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it. Furthermore, these types of regionalisms have a presence and impact on the wider international 
context.
9 On the one hand, they can be seen as favouring or hindering global multilateralism, on 
the other hand, by their mere existence they contribute, to a general process of “contagion”
10 of 
regionalism around the world. Finally, their full accomplishment as internal dynamics creates 
pressure for external action. e.g. a custom union calls for a common trade policy or a strong 
common policy on environment will have to be promoted globally. 
As the first two cohorts of regional schemes don’t exist in a geopolitical vacuum, external 
action  towards  the  outside  world  is  the  most  specific  characteristic  of  “Third-generation” 
regionalism. In this case, the télos is a complete unified foreign policy together with the ambition 
to operate as one actor on the international scene and thus also outside its own territory. This 
implies the willingness and capacity to deal at the regional level of governance with “out of area” 
challenges.
11 Regional organisations, then, develop a strong sense of identity (cohesiveness) and 
assume an ever more confident external profile (actorness) in interacting with third states, with 
other  regions,  and  within  multilateral  institutions.  A  strong  institutionalisation  distinguishes 
“third-generation” regional integration from a mere alliance of countries or a “coalition of the 
willing”, which are both schemes that can be rather active externally. The organisation tends to 
become autonomous or at least distinguishable from its members and develops its own identity, 
interests and institutions across a wide range of issues, not circumscribed within a single policy 
area (comprehensiveness). 
 In  sum,  these  three  cohorts  of  regional  integration  typify  different  characteristics  and 
different téloi of complete integration. In the real world, however, a clear distinction is much 
more difficult. Numerous dynamics such as functional and political spill-over across policies or 
between  the  internal  and  external  dimensions  of  policies  can  facilitate  the  accumulation  and 
overlap of the various generations of regionalism in one region or on one regional organization; 
beyond the initial project of the member states. The case of the European Union is emblematic of 
this  accumulation,  which  makes  to  European  Union  a  fully-fledged  first-generation  regional 
scheme  (e.g.  internal  market  and  monetary  union);  a  partly  accomplished  second-generation 
regional polity (e.g. shared or exclusive competences on almost all policy areas and a developing 
supranational  democratic  structure);  and  an  emerging  third-generation  regional  actor  (almost 
autonomous in economic external relations, and increasingly active in the political and security 
domain). The next pages will focus specifically on the third generation dimension and on how the 
conceptual approach can be applied to the study of the European Union.  
 
Third-generation regionalism as a political objective  
 
As  compared  with  the  first  two  cohorts/generations  of  regionalism,  the  concept  of  “third-
generation”  is  more  a  normative  political  project  than  a  mere  description  of  reality.
12The 
European Union is a developed prototype in this sense: no other regional scheme has the same 
degree of comprehensiveness, cohesiveness, capacity and autonomy. No other organisation, with 
the exclusion of NATO has the same ambition to deploy ‘out of area’ operations. However, the 
EU is by no means unique in this trend towards an enhanced role of regional groups in global 
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governance.
13 Van Langenhove and Costea specify three key features that are specific to the 
third-generation organisation: first, the institutional environment providing the capacity to have 
an  external  action;  second,  the  political  willingness  to  be  proactive  in  engaging  in  bilateral 
relations  with  states  and,  especially,  in  inter-regionalism  with  other  regions,  and;  third,  the 
engagement within the multilateral system, particularly the UN. The first characteristic is related     
to the structure of a third-generation organisation and will be analysed further below. The second 
two  features,  instead,  relate  to  the  goals  of  such  organisations,  which  tend  to  pursue  inter-
regionalism on the one hand, and multilateralism on the other.  
  
Promoting inter-regionalism 
 
Among the objectives of the EU as a foreign policy actor, that of promoting regional cooperation 
in its relations with third countries is the one most EU-specific, as it is linked to its very nature.
14 
The EC started dealing with third countries by grouping them in regions since the 60s when it 
launched its preferential policy towards the African countries, then ACP.
15Since then the EU has 
promoted regionalism both in its economic and political relations, in Africa, Asia, Latin America, 
North Africa and the Gulf, in the Balkans and more recently in the Black Sea region.
16 Smith 
identified  various  reasons  for  this  predilection  for  regionalism,  as  an  objective  and  as  an 
approach:  the  independent  external  demand  coming  from  new  regional  groupings  to  have  a 
relationship with the EU; the belief, coming from experience, that regional integration can bring 
stability  and  growth;  the  recognition  that  neighbouring  countries  are  interdependent;  the 
pragmatic  simplification  of  external  strategies  (the  sheer  number  of  states  in  the  multilateral 
system now, makes it impossible for each one to have separate relationships with everyone else); 
finally, the competition for economic influence with other actors, e.g. the US in Latin America 
and Asia.
17 One can also identify a pro-integration agenda promoted opportunistically by some 
member states and EU institutions, particularly the Commission. Overall, though, much of this 
tendency  has  been  purely  instinctive  and,  as  a  consequence,  not  always  completely  rational. 
Smith defines it as a form of narcissism, while others see it as a search for affinity, and ultimately 
for  identity  and  legitimacy  in  constructing  a  new  post-Westphalian  order  based  on  inter-
regionalism.
18  
The  “value”  of  regional  integration  would  seem  an  instance  of  Europe’s  “normative 
power.”
19However,  there  are  three  important  pitfalls  with  this  regionalist  inclination.  First, 
“mechanical  iso-morphism”:  the  EU’s  tendency  to  impose  regional  integration,  just  by 
establishing copycat institutions and routines and losing sight of the functional policy need.
20 This 
can  undermine  the  legitimacy  and  the  general  support  for  regionalism.  Second,  “strategic 
schizophrenia”: the tendency, which is increasingly perceivable now, of somewhat inconsistently 
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14 Smith 2003. op.cit, pp. 69-96 and Frederik Soderbaum and Luk Van Langenhove (eds.) (2005), “The Politics of 
Interregionalism”, Routledge, London 
    
15 Smith, op.cit., p.69 
    
16 See for all the Commission’s “Communication on EC support for regional economic integration in developing 
countries”, COM (95)219, 16 June 1995. At the time of writing the Commission was holding an online open 
consultation with development stakeholders in view of a new Communication on regional integration in the ACP 
region, closed on 9 May 2008.  
    
17 Smith, op.cit.,  p.83 
    
18 Frederik Soderbaum, Patrick Stalgren and Luk Van Langenhove (2005), “The EU as a Global Actor and the 
Dynamics of Interregionalism: a Comparative Anaysis”, European Integration, Vol 27, n. 3, September 2005, p. 365-
380 
    
19 Ian Manners (2002), “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?”, JCMS, 40/2, 234-258 
    
20 For the specific case of the Mediterranean see, Federica Bicchi “‘Our Size Fits All’: Normative Power Europe and 
the Mediterranean”, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2006, pp. 286-303.   9   
juxtaposing region-to-region dialogue with bilateral relations with so-called “strategic partners”, 
such  as  Brazil,  that  are  also  deeply  involved  in  regional  groupings.  Third,  “disguised 
Eurocentrism”: is third-generation regionalism an exclusively Europe-driven endeavour? If so, is 
the EU really serious about creating a ‘European world order’ made of interacting regions?
21 This 
last question is linked to a second objective, which is crucial to third-generation regionalism: the 
relationship with the multilateral system. In the EU this relationship is subsumed in the concept of 
“effective multilateralism”. 
 
Promoting multilateralism 
 
The term “effective multilateralism” was introduced as a strategic objective of the Union in the 
European Security Strategy.
22 Simply put, it refers to the alleged propensity of the EU to work 
through and for multilateral institutions (including the WTO, the UN, NATO and other regional 
organisations)  and,  at  the  same  time,  its  commitment  to  contribute  to  the  reform  of  the 
multilateral structure in view of making it more effective and more legitimate. There is no doubt 
that the concept served mostly an identity objective of reasserting unity of purpose, following the 
“unilateralist turn” of the United States and the subsequent crisis of CFSP over the war in Iraq.
23 
Beyond the rhetoric, two aspects have to be taken into account. On the one hand, the EU has 
indeed increased its substantial cooperation with the UN, both strategically and operationally on 
all issues, and particularly in the field of security.
24Militarily, for instance, the EU has equipped 
itself with the Battle Groups, designed specifically for operations under UN mandate. The UN has 
also welcomed this process, as it needs regional organisations, and particularly the EU to share 
the burden of global governance.
25 However a generally positive assessment is nuanced by two 
considerations. Firstly, the EU does not fit perfectly in the vision of the UN Charter of regional 
arrangements  as  “Chapter  VIII”  organisations,  as  it  has  a  global  ambition  that  goes  beyond 
Europe (typical of third-generation regionalism).
26 This can produce an overt clash in the long run 
within the current set up and calls for an active participation and a coherent strategy in the reform 
of  the  multilateral  system.  Yet,  secondly,  the  EU  has  maintained  a  visible  division  over  the 
central issue of the reform of the multilateral system, and particularly of the UN Security Council 
(UNSC). The African Union for instance, has been much more open in promoting a new regional 
approach  to  the  reform.  This  internal  EU  division  reveals  the  still  uncertain  stance  of  some 
member states towards the meaning of effective multilateralism, and towards the role of the EU 
and its states within it. Thus although there is a certain tendency towards promoting a “world of 
                                                           
    
21 Hettne, (2005), op.cit. 
    
22 Council of the European Union (2003), “European Security Strategy”, pp 9-10. Importantly, promoting relations 
with regional organisations is considered part of the effort to strengthen global governance under the heading of 
“effective multilateralism”. 
    
23 Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaughtan (2008), “The Foreign Policy of the European Union”, Palgrave 
Macmillan, Basingstoke and Daniele Marchesi (2008), “The EU CFSP in the UN Security Council: Between 
Coordination and Representation”, BRIGG papers, College of Europe and UNU-CRIS, Bruges  
    
24 See in particular the 2003 UN-EU Joint Declaration on Crisis Management.  
    
25 For an interesting discussion: Thierry Tardy (2007), “L’ONU et les Organisations Régionales: de la Compabilité 
entre Multilatéralismes Global et Régional dans le Mantien del la Paix. Le cas de l’Union europénne“ 9th congres 
AFSP, Toulouse, 5-7 September 
    
26 Kennedy Graham and Tania Felicio (2006). “Regional Security and Global Governance: A study of interaction 
between Regional Agencies and the UN Security Council - With a proposal for a Regional-Global security 
mechanism”, VUB Press, Brussels. See also the Statement on behalf of the European Union, by H.E. Mr. Erkki 
Tuomioja, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Seventh High-Level Meeting between the United Nations and 
Regional and other Intergovernmental Organisations, New York 22/9/2006: “the EU supports the development of the 
co-operation between the United Nations and relevant regional organisations as a way to strengthen effective 
multilateralism. However, we strongly advocate a pragmatic and action-oriented approach, both for the EU-UN 
cooperation and for the broader context of cooperation between the UN and regional and other organisations.”  10   
regions”,  an  authentic  political  commitment  is  still  lacking  on  how  to  translate  it  in  the 
multilateral structure.  
In what follows, focus will be on the structural aspects of the EU as a third-generation 
organisation and, in particular, on the plausible impact of the Lisbon Treaty in making the EU 
increasingly comprehensive, capable, cohesive and active externally.   
 
 
 
2. Reforming the EU as a global actor  
 
The two main challenges for CFSP  
 
The idea of continuous reform has always been enshrined in the elusive project of a European 
Common  Foreign  and  Security  Policy  (CFSP)  and,  before  that,  in  European  Political 
Cooperation. Integration in this field is so crucial to national sovereignty that it immediately 
raised  questions  such  as:  is  the  EU  acquiring  a  state-like  foreign  policy?  How  can  one 
conceptualise the EU as a foreign policy actor? What is the impact of the specificities and sui 
generis nature of the EU’s political system on the EU’s external relations?  
Academic discussion focussed on two main dilemmas: (1) the different models of the EU 
on the civilian/military power spectrum and (2) the torn EU’s foreign policy profile between 
intergovernmental and supranational tendencies. This theoretical debate reflected, however, the 
very practical consciousness of the limitations of the EU foreign policy’s capabilities and political 
clout, as well as of the related failures in policy terms, particularly in the Balkans. This, in turn, 
led to identifying two major shortcomings to be addresses in order to transform the EU from an 
affluent payer into an influent player. These were the lack of military power and the insufficient 
institutional  coherence,  which  makes  it  difficult  to  concentrate  political  authority  towards 
common policies. Before focusing on how the Lisbon Treaty tackles the institutional problems, a 
first brief look at the problem of military power.  
Since  the  1998  Franco-British  agreement  in  Saint-Malo,  important  and  relatively  quick 
steps were taken to set up a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), designed to grant 
more autonomy to the EU from the US in the use of force and the capacity to carry out even 
robust missions in the field of peace and security.
27 These efforts were not seriously undercut by 
the  2003  crisis  over  the  second  US  intervention  in  Iraq.
28  In  fact,  by  deploying  its  first 
autonomous mission in Congo in 2003, the EU immediately made it clear that it was committed 
to engaging in ‘out of area’ interventions, in order to assert its image as a global actor. Since the 
end of the nineties, therefore, the EU transformed itself from an authentically “civilian power” 
into what as been defined a “civilising power” or as a “military power in the making.”
29 This 
build-up  has  been  tangible  in  terms  of  capabilities,  institutional  structures  in  Brussels  and 
operations. All this though, has been done while attempting not to sacrifice the positive image 
and  the  soft  power  of  attraction  of  the  EU  as  a  new  type  of  “post-modern”  global  actor.
30 
Therefore, the EU has tried to combine traditional foreign policy goals and tools with more far-
sighted and comprehensive “structural” foreign policies:
31 designed not only for states but also to 
have a deeper influence on the structure of the societies of the recipient countries and on the very 
nature  of  international  relations.  In  this  sense,  the  first  pillar  external  relations,  including 
                                                           
27 Jolyon  Howorth,, (2007) “Security and Defence Policy in the European Union”. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 
Macmillan. 
28 Anand Menon,(2004) “From crisis to catharsis: ESDP after Iraq”, International Affairs 80, 4, pp. 631-648 
29 For a discussion: Karen Smith, “Beyond the civilian power EU debate.” Politique Europeénne 17, 2005, pp. 63-82. 
30 Robert Cooper,(2003) “The New Liberal Imperialism,” The Observer, 7 April 
31 Stephan Keukeleire, (2003) “The European Union as a Diplomatic Actor: Internal, Traditional and 
Structural Diplomacy”, Diplomacy and Statecraft 14/3, 31-56   11   
development policy, humanitarian aid, trade, enlargement and the neighbourhood policy (ENP) 
play a crucial role.  
The quite impressive development of ESDP, however, has been undermined by the much 
less fructiferous attempts to tackle the second, institutional, shortcoming of EU foreign policy. 
This has led some commentators to speak about a defence policy, without a truly “common” 
foreign policy, although there have been considerable steps forward since the late nineties.
32 The 
main institutional problems can be summarised in the multilevel and multi-pillar structure of the 
EU, leading to incoherence and lack of leadership; as well as in the resilience of the unanimity 
rule in the Council of Ministers on CFSP matters, leading to lack of strategy and paralysis. Unlike 
for  the  problem  of  the  deficit  of  military  force,  these  two  institutional  shortcomings  were 
accentuated by enlargement. This promised to increase the complexity of the EU system, the 
diversity between member states and the time needed to take decisions. As a consequence, since 
the beginning of the convention on the future of Europe in 2002, it was widely accepted among 
academics as well as policy-makers that some far-reaching reforms had to be agreed particularly 
in  the  domain  of  foreign  policy.  What,  however,  remained  highly  disputed  was  whether  the 
reforms  had  to  enhance  supranationalism  and  “communitarise”  CFSP,  or  whether  its 
intergovernmental character should be maintained.  
This debate reflected the deeply rooted visions on the future of the EU as a political system, 
including its further development as a “second-generation” regional scheme. Interestingly though, 
this division did not dent the actual pragmatic perception of the need to increase the overall 
efficiency of the foreign policy mechanisms. In fact, even following the rejection of the referenda 
on the Constitutional Treaty in 2005 in France and the Netherlands, some of the agreed changes 
were experimented in practice, e.g. the double-hatting of some head of delegations. Furthermore, 
the EU undoubtedly increased its external activity in the period of crisis or “reflection” in an 
effort to “act itself into being”.
33 All this shows the broad support for reform in external relations 
present in the member states, including in the public opinion.
34  
 
The implications of the Lisbon Treaty 
 
The EU cumulates features of all three generations/cohorts of regionalism, in terms of economic, 
political and external sovereignty. The Lisbon Treaty
35 touches on all three dimension, especially, 
the second and third, pertaining to internal political integration and external actorness. Overall, 
most of the institutional reforms contained in the 2005 Constitutional Treaty were substantially 
preserved.  Analyses  done  on  that  compromise  showed  a  limited  but  tangible  deepening  of 
integration in terms of second-generation regionalism. Some important innovations were agreed, 
such as: the new mechanism for qualified majority voting (QMV); the general expansion of QMV 
and co-decision to most policy areas; a clearer distinction in the division of competencies; an 
increased role for the European Parliament and the Court of Justice; the end of the formal pillar 
structure as well as an enhanced role for national parliaments, especially in safeguarding the 
principle of subsidiarity.
36 What went lost in the 2005-2007 period, were mainly symbols and 
state-like labels such as the words “Constitution” and “Minister of Foreign Affairs.” A major 
difference was in the process adopted for adopting the text, where the participative and inclusive 
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approach  of  the  2002-2003  Convention  on  the  Future  of  Europe  and  of  the  referenda,  was 
sacrificed to the more traditional closed-door diplomatic style of the IGC and of parliamentary 
ratification.
37   
This paper, however, focuses on the third-generation perspective and so on the contribution 
that the reform could bring to the EU’s external actorness. The major changes introduced in 
external relations are the following. A new High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy (art. 18 and 27 TEU), who will also be the Vice President of the Commission for external 
relations (HR/VP); the end of the rotating presidency (and “troika”) in external representation, 
with a permanent and full-time President of the European Council, representing the EU abroad at 
the level of heads of states (art. 15 TEU); the end of the pillar structure and of the EC/EU 
distinction, although CFSP will maintain its specific procedures, e.g. unanimity (art.31 TEU); the 
legal personality conferred to the EU (art. 47 TEU); a European External Action Service (EEAS) 
supporting the HR/VP (art.27 TEU); the possibility for “Permanent Structured Cooperation” in 
the field of defence policy, which would allow states willing and able to meet certain standards to 
move forward in military cooperation and integration (art.42 TEU); a mutual assistance clause for 
defence (art. 28.A.7) and a solidarity clause for the reaction against terrorist attacks and disasters 
(art.188R TFEU); A new legal basis for the ENP (art.8 TEU) was also introduced. To these one 
should add a considerable expansion in the internal policies and competencies (second-generation 
dimension) that have an impact on external relations, such as energy policy (Title XXI TFEU), 
environment/climate change (Title XX TFEU). 
These innovations attempt to tackle some of the problems outlined above. The new double-
hatted  HR/VP  linking  first  and  second  pillar  competences  should  improve  the  problem  of 
institutional (between the Council and the Commission) and of horizontal incoherence (between 
policies).
38 Further, he or she would contribute to the easing of the leadership deficit, and together 
with the president of the European Council, the provision on legal personality, and the end of the 
troika  structure,  should  simplify  EU  external  representation.  Overall,  the  innovation  is 
considerable and there are some expectations towards the possible impact, particularly in terms of 
visibility.
39 As the Convention had already noted, a unified figure dealing with CFSP would 
definitely “improve the visibility, clarity and continuity of the Union on the global stage”.
40  
On the other hand, vertical incoherence (between the member state and EU level) is likely 
to remain a fatal characteristic of EU foreign policy making, due to the unanimity in the Council 
and to the intergovernmental approach. This is true particularly for big member states, who want 
to maintain an independent foreign policy and international role and resist the convergence of 
foreign policy preferences. In this sense, the EU will remain a polity very different from a state. 
This ambiguity reflects the eternal overarching division between intergovernmental and federal 
strategies. The result is an indisputably incremental process of integration, where the equilibrium 
lies  somewhat  in  the  middle  between  the  call  for  effectiveness  on  the  one  hand,  and  the 
maintenance of a strong member state participation on the other.
41  
 
The EU reform and the UN 
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A place of its own in the analysis is the impact of the Lisbon Treaty on the EU profile in the UN. 
As was shown above, inter-regionalism and enhanced presence and actorness in the multilateral 
system are crucial aspects in locating the EU as a third-generation regional organisation. As 
stated by article 21 of the TEU, following the Lisbon Treaty:  
“The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and 
international, regional or global organisations [...]. It shall promote multilateral solutions to 
common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations.” 
 
An EU Seat in the Security Council? 
The UN, therefore, represents an important stage to assess the credibility of the EU as a foreign 
policy actor. And within this context, it is relevant to discuss the issue of the “EU seat” in the 
UNSC. This “EU seat” problem has been at the centre of CFSP development, as it constitutes one 
of the most noticeable points of friction between intergovernmental and supranational thinking on 
the future of the EU integration.
42Considerations on the opportunity of establishing an EU seat 
were  already  part  of  the  IGC  on  a  Political  Union  that  prepared  the  Maastricht  Treaty.
43 
Subsequently,  during  the  2002-2003  Convention  on  the  Future  of  Europe,  the  issue  of  the 
representation of the EU at the UN was debated extensively in the working group VIII on external 
action and III on legal personality.
44 The concept of a European seat was finally turned down both 
for legal (only states can be members of the UNSC) and political considerations (e.g. opposition 
of France and the UK, but also doubts on whether one seat in the UNSC would be better than the 
current many seats). The discussion was further complicated by the problem of the reform of the 
Security Council and by the bid of Germany to obtain a national permanent seat, which divided 
the EU.
45 It was agreed that it was more realistic in the short-term to only moderately enhance the 
capability of the EU to speak with a single voice in the UNSC, without reforming drastically the 
provisions of article 19 TEU, which regulate this delicate issue.  
Of course, the most important institutional element to be agreed upon as a precondition for 
an EU seat (without taking into account here the complexities of the global arena of UN reform), 
is some kind of qualified majority voting (QMV) in CFSP. This was ruled out in the Lisbon treaty 
as in the Constitutional Treaty and is unlikely to re-present itself in the coming years. In general, 
the different type of “double majority” QMV introduced by the Lisbon Treaty will not apply to 
CFSP, a part in limited and largely irrelevant occasions, such as when a detailed and unanimous 
political  decision  has  already  been  taken  at  the  European  Council  level.  Without  such  a 
development and the substantial “communitarisation” of EU foreign policy, an EU seat would be 
damaging,  as  it  would  only  conduce  to  lame  positions  presented  in  the  UNSC  or  constant 
abstention. Although the achievement of common positions on matters of war and peace happens 
increasingly more often within the EU, a fracture such as that on Iraq in 2002-2003 could still 
occur in the present institutional setting.  
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Legal Personality  
Certainly, a (small) part of the arguments used against the EU seat was undercut by the legal 
personality for the EU, finally granted by the Lisbon Treaty.
46 Resisted for years by France and 
the UK, this provision could have in the long-term a beneficial effect for the EU in the UN and 
not only in the UNSC. The EU, in fact, can now as such assume obligations and sign treaties with 
the UN. The innovation will not have all its effects until the UN reforms itself to accept the full 
membership of regional organizations. Yet, there is no question that, at least in principle, this is a 
major step forward from a legal and institutional point of view.
47 In turn, the EU personality 
could lead to major developments in various UN bodies, and notably in the General Assembly. 
Here the EU will have to apply for an enhanced observer status, as the simple succession to the 
EC would relegate it to speaking at the end of every debate, after all the member states.
48 The 
Lisbon treaty in fact, also eliminates the rotating presidency, which has constituted until now an 
easy way for the EU to present common positions through the mouthpiece of an actual UN 
member.  
Concerning the UNSC, since neither the new permanent president of the European Council, 
nor  the  double-hatted  HR/VP  will  be  representing  a  member  state,  they  will  have  to  speak 
following art 39 of UNSC provisional rules procedure (observers and other parties), while until 
now the EU presidency was able to speak following art 37 (for member states). This should not 
constitute in itself a big hurdle, as long as the HR/VP is supported/invited by the member states. 
Art 39 could even constitute an advantage in terms of visibility/identity, as the EU would speak 
behind its own nameplate instead than a member state’s one.  
 
Coordination on the Security Council  
 
Looking at the innovations introduced with the reformulation of article 19 (now article 34), it is 
impossible not to recognise the very limited will amongst key member states, to improve EU 
coordination and representation in the UNSC. The article now states: 
“Member  States  which  are  also  members  of  the  United  Nations  Security  Council  will 
concert and keep the other Member States and the High Representative fully informed. Member 
States which are members of the Security Council will, in the execution of their functions, defend 
the positions and the interests of the Union, without prejudice to their responsibilities under the 
provisions of the United Nations Charter.” 
The previous distinction between non-permanent and permanent members has disappeared. 
Though  in  the  European  context  this  change  of  formulation  is  supposed  to  re-establish  the 
equality among the EU member states serving in the UNSC, it does not have any effect on the 
prerogatives of France and UK as veto holders in the UN framework. Fassbender minimizes both 
the  raison  d’ètre  and  the  implications  of  this  amendment.  This  view  is  supported  by  the 
preservation  of  art.19’s  last  sentence  that  prioritizes  the  UN  responsibilities  over  EU 
membership.
49  Nevertheless,  even  this  minor  change  in  the  formulation  is  a  further 
acknowledgement of a gradual evolution from the initial national perspective and testifies of the 
great pressure to enhance the European dimension of this article both during the Convention and 
the IGCs.  
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The High Representative 
 
The most important change for EU foreign policy comes clearly from the establishment of the 
double-hatted HR/VP.
50At the UN, this innovation was long-waited to tackle the problem of the 
dispersive representation of the EU. This is currently voiced, by the troika (e.g. meetings with 
third countries or the UN Secretariat), by the Commission for EC exclusive competences, by the 
Presidency for mixed competences, and by the member states, who often resonate or specify a 
common position. The HR/VP could give the EU a single voice in New York and in the UNSC, 
especially in combination with the new provision of article 34.3 third paragraph that states: 
“When  the  Union  has  defined  a  position  on  a  subject  which  is  on  the  United  Nations 
Security Council agenda, those Member States which sit on the Security Council shall request 
that the High Representative be invited to present the Union’s position.”  
The insertion of this provision should not create too much enthusiasm. It is the codification 
of an already established practice of inviting the High Representative Javier Solana to the UNSC 
open meetings to express CFSP common positions. In short, the presence of the HR/VP or of 
his/her representative in the Security Council will continue to be dependent on the good will and 
invitation of the member states. Obviously, when such a common position has been agreed by 
unanimity among the capitals and in Brussels, the EU members in the UNSC are by definition 
bound to it. To change the quality of EU coordination in the UNSC the role of the HR/VP should 
be  also  enhanced  in  the  ascending  phase  of  the  decision  making  process,  in  the  closed-door 
meetings, at least to allow him/her to be well informed of the situation.  
 
Personalities and Practice and the External Action Service 
 
In  sum,  there  is  some  evidence,  that  the  provisions  of  the  Lisbon  treaty,  if  ratified,  would 
establish some incremental improvements in the institutional context of the EU presence at the 
UN. Some innovations do open institutional opportunities that could be taken if the political will 
emerges. The HR/VP would be equipped with the necessary status and tools to play a role in the 
current configuration, if the member states support (or at least avoid boycotting!) him or her. To 
go into speculation, the HR/VP could also play a role in case the idea of an EU seat or other more 
conservative proposals, such as that to include a representative of the EU institutions in one of the 
national delegation in the Security Council, see the light.
51So far, though, this innovation has been 
vetoed by the two EU permanent members, who have an interest in limiting the EU presence in 
order to retain their autonomy in the UNSC.
52 
Yet, if the member states grip is still firm on the single provisions contained in the treaty, 
less strong is their control on the day-to-day implementation. In this sense, personalities and 
practice will play a crucial role in determining the actual impact of the structural reforms agreed 
in Lisbon.
53  
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Concerning  the  first  factor,  the  choice  of  the  person  who  will  serve  in  the  position  of 
HR/VP will be extremely important in determining from the start, the ambition, the independence 
and the scope of action of this new institution. In fact, the Treaty has not solved the tensions 
between the intergovernmental and supranational poles, which are so typical of the EU. In a way, 
it has just transferred them on the head of one person. As an institutional agent, the HR/VP will 
have to be loyal both to the Commission and to the member states, via the Council. He/she will 
have huge responsibilities and duties and will have to prioritise his or her resources and time, 
leading to potential clashes between its two principals. In this sense, the prestige, background and 
authority of the HR/VP and how he or she will get along with the President of the Commission 
and the President of the European Council will be critical. This is particularly true for the first 
period of the mandate, which will constitute the political precedent to the following years. 
The  institutional  struggle  over  the  configuration  of  the  External  Action  Service  (EAS) 
provides  an  example  of  the  current  uncertainty  and  of  the  importance  of  the  first  years  of 
implementation and practice. This will be a first test to the equilibrium struck by the text.
54 The 
service is to include elements of the Commission staff, of the Council Secretariat and seconded 
staff from the member states. However, the final dimension of the service, its overall autonomy 
and the actual proportion of the various component parts, are under negotiation. According to the 
Treaty,  the  final  deal  will  have  to  be  rubberstamped  by  all  the  member  states,  the  council 
secretariat and the European commission. Also the European Parliament wants to have a strong 
word.  The  conflict  between  effectiveness  and  member  states  participation  is  particularly 
prominent  here  so,  even  after  the  formal  agreement,  the  tension  on  day-to-day  practice  will 
persist.  
Overall  though,  the  EAS  has  the  potential  to  “lubricate”  the  EU  external  relations 
machinery,  including  in  New  York.  Having  single  EU  delegations  around  the  world,  with  a 
coherent  political  guidance  from  unified  desks  in  Brussels  and  incorporating  Member  States 
preferences and expertise will rationalize and streamline the external and diplomatic action of the 
EU. Eventually, this could increase its capacity to concentrate authority strategically (and perhaps 
financially) and could improve coherence at all levels, including vertically, between member 
states and the EU.  
 
Conclusions 
 
While  recognising  the  uniqueness  of  the  EU,  the  three-generation  typology  offers  a  useful 
conceptual framework to compare and assess its development as a regional integration scheme 
among  others.  First  (economic  sovereignty),  second  (internal  sovereignty)  and  third  (external 
severeignity) generation features all coexist and cumulate within the EU as in other organisations, 
but are not equally developed. Economically, full integration in Europe is almost accomplished. 
In  turn,  from  a  more  political  perspective  much  remains  to  be  done,  both  internally  and 
externally, although the EU certainly represents the most advanced example of supranational 
polity. This paper has focused on the third, external dimension of regional integration, looking at 
the foreign policy goals of the EU (inter-regionalism and multilateralism), and at the development 
of its institutional structure in foreign policy, particularly with the Lisbon Treaty.  
In conclusion, the EU continues to develop into a new type of global actor: different from a 
state  and  in  equilibrium  between  intergovernmental  and  supranational/federal  pressures.  It  is 
somewhat misleading to “measure its success” against mystified images of world super-power.
55 
Although, military force continues to be a major factor in a world still inhabited by modern 
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Westphalian logics and even pre-modern (non-state or failed states) actors,
56 the EU is largely 
preserving  its  post-modern  character.  This  is  not  a  bad  thing.  Comprehensive  and  structural 
foreign  policy  seems  a  more  suitable  strategy  to  tackle  today’s  global  challenges,  which  are 
largely  non-military:  global  warming,  sustainable  development,  energy  security,  migration, 
terrorism.  
The Lisbon Treaty has recognised these challenges as new objectives to be dealt with both 
at the regional and multilateral level. Thus, as it fosters regional cooperation and integration 
around the world, the EU promotes a new “European world order”,
57 in which regional actors 
contribute  to  sharing  the  burden  of  the  UN  in  global  governance.  In  this  sense,  the  EU  is 
becoming a fully-fledged third-generation regional organisation: comprehensive in scope, capable 
in means, with a cohesive identity and the willingness to act externally. 
Beyond the rhetoric however, a lot is still lacking in order to meet these high expectations. 
While the EU has done a lot to shift away from being an exclusively civilian power, becoming 
increasingly willing and able to use force, its internal structural contradictions are still preventing 
it from setting up a truly common foreign policy. The Lisbon Treaty will have some implications 
in terms of increased coherence and improved visibility, including within the United Nations. 
However, it will leave unsolved most of the key dilemmas between federal and intergovernmental 
strategies and between effectiveness and member states control. This ambiguity will continue to 
hamper the capacity of Europe to concentrate authority and power in its foreign policy. The 
lesson is that, although there is functional pressure towards regionalism around the world, the first 
condition for the formation of a “world of regions” is still the willingness of sovereign states to 
genuinely embark in integration.  
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